By adapting theories for the decline of mutualism developed in evolution and natural sciences, we put forward an explanation for the decline of social capital based on its obsolescence. In our economy, agents with specific knowledge are "held up" by their principals. Inside communities, agents learn about each other and thereby engage in mutual aid, preventing the hold-up. As they learn about each other, agents share knowledge and gain flexibility. In the long run, this may render mutual aid obsolete and cause its decline.
Introduction
In the last ten years or so, a burgeoning literature across social sciences has investigated the concept of social capital. 1 Though scholars propose different definitions, this can be thought as "features of social life -networks, norms, and trust -that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives. Social capital, in short, refers to social connections and the attendant norms and trust" (Putnam, 1995, p. 664-5) . It is argued that social capital may compensate for the fragility of legal institutions. According to Hardin (2003, p. 2) , by enabling us "to cooperate without the use of the sanctions of the law [...] social capital (norms and relationships) can be used * Luis Araujo (corresponding author). Department of Economics, Michigan State University. E-mail: araujolu@msu.edu. Address: 101 Marshall Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824-1038. We wish to thank Edward Glaeser, Luigi Guiso, James Rauch, Paola Sapienza, and several seminar participants for helpful suggestions and conversations. All to displace what might be considered another form of capital (legal institutions) that is putatively less effective or efficient". 2 The benefits of social capital have been explored in a broad range of contexts: High levels of social capital appear to be crucial for economic growth and development, the good functioning of labor and financial markets, the efficient provision of public goods, effective political institutions, low crime rates, and low incidences of other social problems (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004; Dasgupta, 2003; Hardin, 2003) . In the light of these alleged benefits, it is hardly surprising that 1999, and the references therein). Phenomena such as the rise in work hours, income inequality, female work participation, commute times, TV watching, as well as the increased fragmentation of metropolitan areas by income, race and ethnicity, have been blamed for this decline (Costa and Kahn, 2003; Sobel, 2002) . 3 In this paper, we show that social capital may decline because of a purely physiological process of obsolescence. This obsolescence may endogenously originate from the mutations of the environment that social capital generates, without any exogenous socioeconomic factor playing a role. Our hypothesis is inspired by studies in evolution theory and in natural sciences. Evolution and natural scientists argue that in nature organisms often engage in mutualism (or symbiosis) and face hostile environments together. Most importantly, mutualism can induce modifications in the organisms (symbionts) which eventually render mutualism itself unnecessary (see, for example, Watson, Reil, and Pollack, 2000; Watson and Pollack, 1999; Margulis, 1993; and Cavanaugh, 1994 thereby become able to face the hostile environment independently. 4 We adapt this hypothesis to an economic environment to explain the decline of mutualism among economic agents. Borrowing from a vast literature (see, for example, Caballero and Hammour, 1998 , and the references therein), we construe the hostility of the economic environment as a risk of exploitation (hold-up) due to agents' lack of flexibility. Inside communities, agents aid each other to face exploitation. Mutual aid may materialize in interpersonal relationships of several forms:
Agents advise each other, share knowledge, cooperate in production, marry among themselves. In turn, all these forms of cultural and genetic mixing may bridge differences among agents, rendering them more flexible and, thus, less exposed to the risk of exploitation. Eventually, this may render mutual aid obsolete and determine its decline. Here, we focus on community learning as the mechanism that fosters agents' flexibility.
We now describe our hypothesis more in detail. The economy is populated by principals and agents who engage in productive matches. Agents have knowledge of different types and types have a limited degree of substitutability. This renders agents specific, exposing them to being "held up" by their principals. In fact, principals can threaten to withhold "actions" necessary for the continuation of the matches and, by exploiting agents' limited ability to rematch with other principals, appropriate rents. As in a vast literature, 5 anticipating the hold-up, agents are discouraged from investing in specific knowledge. In turn, this inefficiently depresses production.
In our economy, a scheme of mutual aid among agents can prevent the hold-up problem. Inside a community, an agent can provide aid to another by learning and implementing the action necessary for the continuation of her match. Therefore, mutual aid prevents principals from threatening to sever matches at their will but it entails learning costs. We show that in the long run mutual aid may be abandoned. As agents learn about each other, they share knowledge and, hence, gain flexibility. As a result of the increase in agents' flexibility, the hold-up problem becomes less severe and mutual aid may lose its net benefit, becoming obsolete. If this happens, the agents will abandon mutual aid. 4 Watson, R., T. Reil, and J. Pollack (2000) use these illuminating words: "We call this effect symbiotic scaffolding:
the symbionts support each other as partially able organisms, and enable the gradual accumulation of abilities, until ultimately, when their abilities are complete, the scaffolding is not required." 5 See Caballero and Hammour (1998) for a review of the hold-up literature.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we relate our contribution to the literature. In section 3, we lay out the setup and solve for the dynamics and the steady state.
In section 4, we extend the setup. In section 5, we conclude.
Related Literature
This paper closely relates to two strands of the economic literature. The first explores factors that may undermine social norms and relationships and their possible impact on efficiency and growth. Sethi and Somanathan (1996) investigate the benefit of social norms in mitigating the over-exploitation of a common resource. They show that social norms can be put under pressure by the incursion of outsiders immune to local sanctions. Sethi and Somanathan (1996) Kranton (1996) appear to formalize the argument that industrialization and the expansion of anonymous markets can corrode social relations. Besides putting forward different explanations for the decline of social norms or relationships, all these papers attribute this decline to disruptive socioeconomic forces. Showing that instead social capital has an intrinsic tendency to become obsolete and be depleted through use is critical for shaping the concept of social capital. In fact, the treatment of social norms and relationships as a form of capital is sometimes criticized on the ground that, unlike physical and human capital, social capital is not subject to decay, but rather it appreciates by use (see Sobel, 2002; and Omstrom, 1999 , for more on this point). and specificity and the consequences of this interaction for the long run dynamics of social capital.
The Model
Consider a discrete time economy populated by two unit continua of individuals, principals and agents. Principals are infinitely lived, while agents live for one period. At the beginning of each period t, the cohort of agents born at the beginning of period t−1 dies and a new cohort is born that inherits its characteristics. Principals and agents are risk-neutral and derive utility from consuming the unique good. All non-pecuniary costs and benefits are expressed in utils.
We first describe the production sector and solve for its equilibrium in each period in the absence of a social structure (3.1). We then introduce the social structure (3.2). Finally, we solve for the dynamics and the steady state of the economy (3.3).
Production Sector
Technology Agents have productive knowledge. Knowledge can be of three types: a (say, arts), b (say, business) and ab, a mixed type that combines notions of a and b. In period t, the distribution of agents across types is denoted by m t = (m at , m bt , m abt ). Initially agents are either of type a or of type b and, in particular, m 0 = (
The distribution m t endogenously evolves in a way to be specified.
that there is no scope for endogenously analyzing the decline of social capital.
In each period, a principal can employ at most two agents in the production of the good. At the beginning of a period, say instant t 1 , each principal is randomly matched with an agent. At an intermediate stage, say instant t 2 , the principal may carry out an "action" necessary for the continuation of this match 7 (e.g. provide critical advice, information or training to the agent). We want to capture the idea that an agent cannot carry out the action necessary for her match without the aid of other agents and that this exposes her to being held up by her principal. Therefore, we assume that learning the action necessary for an a agent requires notions of knowledge b that only b or ab agents possess. Analogously, learning the action necessary for a b agent requires notions of knowledge a that only a or ab agents possess. Finally, consistent with the idea that ab is a mixed type that combines notions of a and b, learning the action necessary for an ab agent is possible for everyone with knowledge ab except for the agent herself. 8 After choosing whether to carry out the action, the principal can employ a second agent in production, as long as she randomly meets one. This agent is productive if and only if she is of the same type of the first agent met. This aims at capturing the idea that, once specialized, a principal cannot employ an agent who does not fit her specialization. At the end of the period, the first (second) agent produces an amount y of good with probability e 1it (e 2it ) and zero otherwise, where e 1it (e 2it ) denotes the knowledge investment of the first (second) agent and i = a, b, ab.
Each agent chooses knowledge investment at t 2 , before principals may carry out their actions, facing an effort cost
Henceforth, we restrict ourselves to the case in which the feasibility constraint e 1it (e 2it )≤ 1 is always slack. A sufficient condition that ensures this is y < c.
Contractual Structure The economy features limited contractual enforceability. The interim action of a principal and the investment decision of an agent cannot be contracted upon at t 1 .
Therefore, a principal and an agent can only contract upon the allocation of the output produced by the agent at the end of the period as well as on possible lump-sum transfers at t 1 . Furthermore, the 7 For example, Aghion and Bolton (1992) introduce an analogous assumption in the analysis of the relationship between a lender (principal) and a borrower (agent). 8 Assuming that a and/or b agents can learn the action necessary for an ab agent would leave the results unchanged.
allocation of output can be renegotiated. In any negotiation bilateral bargaining is of a symmetric Nash type. 9 
Within Period Equilibrium
We solve for the within period equilibrium in the production sector by backward induction. We first solve for the bargaining between an agent who has separated from her original principal at t 2 and a new principal specialized in her type (note that in equilibrium no separation will occur). We then solve for the decision of a principal whether to carry out the action at t 2 . Finally, we solve for the investment of an agent.
Given the symmetric bargaining, both an agent and a new principal obtain y/2 with probability e it . Hence, if an agent has separated from her original principal at t 2 , her expected return is
Intuitively, m it , which measures the probability that an agent of type i meets a new principal specialized in her type, captures the "market flexibility" of the agent.
At t 2 , a principal can threaten to withhold her action and determine the dissolution of the match formed at t 1 . Using this threat as a lever, the principal can force a renegotiation of the allocation of output agreed at t 1 (hold-up). Precisely, the principal can commit not to carry out her action if a standstill is reached in the renegotiation. In expectation, the output generated by the agent if she stays with her original principal is e it y, while the outside option of the agent is given by (2) . Solving the bargaining in the renegotiation, the agent obtains
We now solve for the investment of an agent. An agent maximizes her expected return (3) net of her investment cost (1), choosing
Importantly, (3) and (4) show that the expected return and the investment of an agent of type i are increasing in the share of principals m it who have specialized in her type, i.e. her market flexibility. 9 Provided that principals' and agents' bargaining power exceeds zero, the allocation of the bargaining power is not crucial for our qualitative results.
At t 1 , an agent and her principal engage in lump-sum transfers, for example in the form of perks, 10 and equally share the total expected surplus S it , where
Finally, note that in equilibrium at t 2 each principal carries out the action and no match is dissolved. This also implies that each principal employs only one agent in a period.
Social Structure
Communities and Mutual Aid Thus far we have assumed that agents are locked in isolated matches, with no possibility of interacting with each other. We think of this as an economy where frictions in the meeting process are severe. We now relax this assumption: Inside a community agents can meet and aid each other to prevent the hold-up of principals. Precisely, each agent can learn and make available to other agents the actions necessary for their matches.
At the onset of the economy all agents are in isolation; At the very beginning of each period -an instant t 0 before t 1 -a generic agent j born in isolation can join the community by incurring a nonpecuniary entry cost τ j (e.g. a cost for engaging in social interactions). 11 The initial distribution of τ across agents is uniform with support [τ , τ ], for both type a and type b agents. We could specify the mechanism of mutual aid in different ways. The key feature we want to capture is a lag between the decision of an agent whether to provide aid and her access to the aid of other agents.
Thus, we specify a two stage mechanism. At t 1 , before contracts are written, each agent inside the community can incur a non-pecuniary learning cost L. By incurring the cost, an agent of type a (b) learns the action necessary for the match of any agent of type b (a); Analogously, an agent of type ab learns the action necessary for the match of any other agent of type ab. By incurring the cost, an agent also makes available the action she has learnt. After all agents in the community 10 Introducing a limited liability constraint would obscure the loss of efficiency induced by the hold-up problem. In 3.3, we show that agents' choices before instant t1 depend on the amount of surplus they expect to obtain from the matches. We want these choices to be driven only by efficiency considerations and not by distributional issues. 11 Given our assumption that a new cohort of agents inherits the characteristics of the previous one, if an agent is part of the community in period t, the agent that replaces her in period t + 1 will also be born inside the community.
Hence, she will not need to incur the entry cost τ to join the community. Correspondingly, if an agent is not part of the community in period t, the agent that replaces her in period t + 1 will inherit the same cost τ . have decided whether to incur the cost L, each agent who has incurred the cost has access to the action made available by another agent; Each agent who has not incurred the cost is expelled from the community.
Lemma 1 describes the conditions under which an equilibrium with mutual aid exists, i.e. an agent of type i is willing to incur the cost L. We focus on symmetric equilibria where agents of the same type behave in the same way.
Lemma 1 As long as
there exists an equilibrium in which an agent of type i = a, b, ab inside the community learns and makes available the action necessary for the matches of other agents. Under this equilibrium, at t 1 the agent and her principal equally share the expected surplus S n , where
Proof. Under the mutual aid equilibrium, the principal's threat to withhold her action at t 2 is innocuous. Hence, since the principal cannot force a renegotiation of the allocation of output agreed upon at t 1 , she can contractually commit the output y in case of success to the agent. The agent's knowledge investment is then e n and the surplus is S n . On the equilibrium path, the expected gain of an agent that incurs the cost L is then given by Sn 2 − L. The gain from following the equilibrium is larger than the gain from deviating and being expelled from the community as long as
Using (4), (5), (7), and (8), and operating algebraic manipulations, we can rewrite this condition as (6) .
Community Learning Inside the community, the agents who engage in mutual aid learn about other agents. In the spirit of Mailath and Postlewaite (2004) , for example, we specify a simple rule for the evolution of types aimed at representing the impact of community learning on agents'
knowledge. 12 In (10), the first letter (pair of letters) in parenthesis denotes the type of the learning agent, the second letter (pair of letters) the type of the agents she learns about and the last letter (pair of letters) the type of the learning agent at the end of the period, after she has assimilated the knowledge of other agents.
(a, a) → a (10)
The rule in (10) simply captures the idea that an agent who has notions of one type of knowledge and assimilates notions of the other type will combine the two types of notions and will become a mixed type ab.
Discussion: Mutual aid and Community Learning
There is rich evidence on the community learning associated with mutual aid and on its effects on agents' knowledge. Here, we provide some examples (see , Durlauf finds evidence of intense knowledge sharing within networks of manufacturers. Guiso and Jappelli (2005) focus on financial knowledge and find that in Italy community learning contributes to create a common "equity culture", meant as shared knowledge about financial instruments and investment opportunities.
Steady State and Dynamics
We are interested in the case in which inside the community the mutual aid equilibrium is realized in period 0. This requires that
which, after substituting for S i0 (i = a, b) and S n using (4), (5), (7), and (8), can be rewritten as
( 1 2 ) γ can be thought as a measure of the net cost of mutual aid: For a given distribution of types m, the higher γ, the higher the learning cost relative to the benefit of mutual aid.
In what follows, we solve for agents' decision whether to join the community and we characterize the dynamics and the steady state of the economy. Observe that no agent with positive entry cost has the incentive to join the community if she does not expect that the mutual aid equilibrium will be realized. We then focus on the case in which an agent expects this. Consider a generic agent i = a, b with entry cost τ j . This agent compares her expected return from joining the community with her expected return from staying in isolation, i.e.
( 1 3 ) The agent takes three elements into account. First, joining the community entails an entry cost τ j while staying in isolation entails no cost. Second, under the mutual aid equilibrium, the agent incurs a learning cost L inside the community. Third, under the mutual aid equilibrium, the agent's investment and the surplus she expects to extract will be higher (
2 ). Using (4)- (8) and the definition of γ in (12), we obtain that the agent will join the community if and only if
( 1 4 ) Given agents' optimal behavior in (14) and the specified process for the evolution of types in (10), the dynamics of m it (i = a, b) can be described by the difference equation
Clearly, the dynamics of m it depends on all the parameters of the model. In order to simplify the exposition of our results, we fix the support of the distribution of entry costs. 13 Precisely, henceforth we set τ = 0 and τ in a way such that a type a (b) agent with entry cost τ is indifferent between joining the community and staying in isolation when the measure of type a (b) agents is zero, that is when her market flexibility is minimum. After algebraic manipulations, (15) becomes
Since m a0 = m b0 , m at = m bt for all t. This implies that m abt = 1 − 2m it and the dynamics of
In proposition 1, we characterize the steady state. 13 Results for a generic range are available from the authors.
Proposition 1 There exists a value b γ ∈ ( 2 for m ab = 9 − 16γ, we obtain that, in steady state, S n − 2L ≥ (<)S ab as long as γ ≥ (<)
γ all agents will engage in mutual aid; otherwise, no agent will engage in mutual aid.
Proposition 1 conveys the result of this paper. The proposition shows that, despite being diffused in the early stages of our economy, mutual aid may be abandoned in the long run. Intuitively, the flow of agents into the community progressively modifies the distribution of types. In particular, the process of community learning increases the measure of ab agents. As this measure rises, the market flexibility of ab agents rises too, increasing the surplus they can extract in case of a forced renegotiation of their contractual agreements with principals (see (3)). This fosters the investment they will implement if they are not aided and reduces the potential hold-up cost. Hence, in the long run the benefit of mutual aid net of the learning cost may become negative or zero. If this happens, the scheme of mutual aid will become obsolete and will be abandoned.
Whether mutual aid survives or is abandoned in the long run depends on the measure of agents who join the community and, hence, become of type ab. Proposition 1 shows that, for the assumed values of τ and τ , mutual aid survives for polar values of γ. The intuition is as follows. Mutual aid has the benefit of fostering agents' investment but it entails a learning cost. When mutual aid has a high benefit, that is γ ≤ and becomes zero in the long run. Consider this case more in detail. In the first twelve periods, the dynamics of mutual aid is driven by the flows of a and b agents into the community. These agents engage in mutual aid to obtain protection from the hold-up of their principals. As for the ab agents inside the community, although their share and hence their market flexibility progressively rises, they prefer engaging in mutual aid. After twelve periods, mutual aid exhibits a sizable drop:
The ab agents inside the community achieve such a market flexibility that for them the benefit of mutual aid becomes lower than the learning cost. Hence, they abandon mutual aid. After this drop, mutual aid smoothly declines until it is entirely abandoned in the long run. In this last phase of the transition, two opposite flows drive the dynamics of mutual aid. In each period, new agents of type a and b join the community and engage in mutual aid. However, the ab agents who are born inside the community abandon mutual aid because for them its benefit is lower than the learning cost. In each period, the outflow of ab agents is larger than the inflow of a and b agents and this explains the smooth decline of mutual aid.
Extensions
Thus far, we have focussed on a setup where agents do not care about the future impact that learning has on types. This setup has two appealing features. First, it is analytically simple.
Second, it fits the time frame we have in mind. Learning is a slow, long run phenomenon. It is then plausible that, when deciding whether to join the community, an agent cares about the protection of mutual aid inside the community rather than about the future impact of learning. In what follows, we show that the results carry through when agents care about the future impact of learning.
To ease comparisons with the previous setup, we subdivide each period into two sub-periods: in the first an agent is young (y), in the second she is old (o). The events in each sub-period coincide with those in a period of the previous setup; The crucial feature is that an agent does not discount between the two sub-periods. We also assume that an agent can join the community only when young.
We first consider a constrained case when an agent who engages in mutual aid when young must continue to do so when old. 14 Consider the period t problem of an agent of type i = a, b with entry cost τ j . She will join the community if and only if 14 Note that this constraint only affects the problem of an agent who wants to be part of the community when young but not when old.
S o it using (4) and (5), we can rewrite (18) as
which, operating algebraic manipulations, implies e m y it+1 = Pr
Consistent with the previous setup, we set τ = 0 and τ in a way such that a type a (b) agent with entry cost τ is indifferent between joining the community and staying in isolation when the measure of a (b) agents is zero in both sub-periods, that is when her market flexibility is minimum. Note also that, since a new cohort of agents inherits the characteristics of the previous one, e m
In proposition 2, we characterize the steady state in this constrained case.
Proposition 2 Let γ ∈ (0, 9 16 ). Under the constraint that an agent who engages in mutual aid when young must continue to do so when old, the steady state distribution of agents across types is the same as in proposition 1. The implications for mutual aid are unaltered.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of proposition 1 and is therefore omitted.
While the steady state is unaltered, in every period t > 0 of the transition the cumulative measure of agents who have joined the community is larger than in the previous setup. This is intuitive: Since the market flexibility of a and b agents decreases over time, the expected net benefit of joining the community is larger when an agent takes into account her reduced flexibility when old.
We now consider the unconstrained case when agents may abandon mutual aid when old. First, consider the region γ ∈ (0, 9 16 ). In this region, the benefit S n 2 − L of engaging in mutual aid is always higher than the benefit S ab 2 of leaving the community after becoming an ab type. Therefore, proposition 2 carries through and the measure of agents who engage in mutual aid converges to min{1, 9 − 16γ}. Now consider the region γ ∈ ( 2 . Given this definition of t 0 , in any period t ≥ t 0 + 1 each agent who joins the community when young leaves it when old.
In sum, as in the previous setup, in the region γ ∈ ( 1 4 , b γ) there exists a period t 0 such that for t ≤ t 0 the agents who engage in mutual aid consist of the ab agents at t plus the a and b agents who have joined the community at t. For t > t 0 , instead, the agents who engage in mutual aid consist only of the a and b agents who have joined the community at t. Moreover, for t > t 0 the measure of agents who engage in mutual aid declines over time and converges to zero in the long-run as in the previous setup. Finally, note that in any period t ≥ t 0 + 1 more agents join the community than in the constrained case and, a fortiori, than in the previous setup. This is intuitive: In the constrained case, joining the community forces an agent to engage in mutual aid when old even when this is worse than abandoning mutual aid (i.e. for t ≥ t 0 + 1). Hence, for t ≥ t 0 + 1 an agent's expected net benefit from joining the community is certainly lower in the constrained case than in the unconstrained one.
Conclusion
We have presented a model in which the level of social capital and the flexibility of productive resources interact with each other. We have shown that social capital may represent a collective response to the risk of exploitation (hold-up) that stems from agents' lack of flexibility. Furthermore, by facilitating knowledge sharing, social capital progressively renders agents more flexible, eroding its own benefit in the long run. We have interpreted this as a process of "obsolescence", analogous to the obsolescence featured by other forms of capital. Most importantly, we have shown that the obsolescence of social capital can lead to its decline.
In our economy, mutual aid may exhibit a sizable drop and then smoothly decline. This may appear an unappealing feature of the environment. In a longer, working paper version, we show that a smooth dynamics can be attained if we allow for a sluggish adjustment in the diffusion of mutual aid. In particular, we allow for inertial adjustment using an evolutionary game-theoretic approach to describe dynamics. All the results of the paper carry through in this modified environment and the decline of mutual aid becomes smoother.
This analysis offers material for reflection in a methodological perspective. Scholars have recently been exploring the role of institutions in shaping socioeconomic behavior. The long-run impact of institutions on the environment and the feed-back effect on their own relevance is often neglected. For social capital, which inherently builds on interaction and mixing, this issue appears to be especially relevant. Therefore, treating the evolution of the environment as exogenous to the accumulation of social capital can distort the conclusions of researchers.
